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Abstract Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question
are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to
the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe.
This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An
interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account
of causal closure, suggesting a view in which universes are causally closed whereas
interfaces are not. On this basis, universes are not affected by other universes directly
but rather indirectly.
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1 Introduction
Let us say that a universe is a domain of things of a certain ontological status, e.g.,
physical things or mental things. Causal closure, then, concerns the possibility that
there may be more than one universe. In this paper, we in principle go back to Descartes
and Princess Elisabeth and their discussion of the relation between substances
of mind and body. We implicitly address the question of whether there are non-
physical objects and therefore one or more domains of non-physical objects. Are there,
e.g., purelymental objects ormathematical objects? Explicitly, however, we address the
question of whether we can save causal closure without giving up on the possibility of
pluralism.
The structure of the argument is as follows: Causal closure seems to cause serious
problems.Whenwe consider causal closure of the physical domain, one problem is that it
does not seem to reach the cause of a very first physical event. Additionally, this problem
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it seems that we are unable to find the cause of a first mental object.What may beworse is
that causal closure prevents us from coming into contact with other potential universes. If
there are mental objects, whereas ‘we’ are physical, then any contact seems impossible.
Additionally, a consistent argument for our inhabiting a physical domain is as strong as a
consistent argument for our inhabiting any non-physical domain. Simultaneously, how-
ever, the soundness of causal closure seems analytical: The domain of, e.g., the physical
on a conceptual level should contain the things that any physical thing causes and, vice
versa, all things that cause any physical thing. The suggested loophole is found by
disentangling from this ‘analytical’ truth and then seeking an alternative without letting
go of what seems necessary with causal closure.
Therefore, the ‘universes’ that are discussed have ‘substances’ or contents, but any two
universes have contents that cannot causally interact. For instance, you cannot move the
things on your desk by thought. The question that is addressed concerns the possibility
that, nevertheless, there is some type of causal connection between some two different
universes. The key, actually, will be found in an alternative way of stating the first sentence
in this very paragraph: ‘Therefore, the Buniverses^ that are discussed have Bsubstances^ or
contents, but any two universes have contents that cannot causally interact’.
Above, we assert that a universe is a domain of things of a certain ontological status.
Without stating any existential claims, we can exemplify this point with, first, ‘a domain
of physical things’, D1, and, second, ‘a domain of mental things’, D2. The first sentence
in the previous paragraph, then, claims that no set of things in D1 has any causal bearing
on any set of things in D2 (and vice versa). The key now is to take a step back and
suggest that it is sufficient for causal closure that D1 and D2 have no causal interaction,
leaving it open as to there being any ‘causal bearing’ between the two. Naturally, this
concept appears paradoxical, but it is our starting point towards the ‘loophole’ that arises
whenwe change perspective fromwhere the causes are to where they are not. According
to a standard view of causal closure, the causes of the things in the domain of the
physical are in that very domain. If we alter this way of understanding causal closure and
examine the alternative that the causes of the things in the domain of the physical are not
in any other domain (of some non-physical things), then the loophole emerges if there
are interfaces between domains of things that themselves are not domains of things.
Next, we focus on a standard definition of causal closure.
2 Causal Closure 1.0
One way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this: If you pick any
physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take
you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will ever cross the
boundary between the physical and the nonphysical. (Kim 1998, p. 40).
Kim has elaborated on this principle, arguing that the mind seems physical. To push
it a step further, if we assume that we are physical (to any degree), then everything that
we causally interact with is physical. Although this principle is common in many
camps, it has an odd feature. First, if we generalize the principle, i.e., any domain is
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causally closed, then it is neutral as to what we are and everything around us is. For
instance, if we, to any degree, are mental, then everything we causally interact with is
mental. Additionally, if something we causally interact with is mathematical, then
everything we causally interact with ends up being mathematical.
Actually, Tegmark (2008) has given an account that takes our physical world to be
mathematical: ‘I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it [the
External Reality Hypothesis] implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis […] that
our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure’ (p. 101). The External Reality
Hypothesis is the common sense view that ‘[t] here exists an external physical reality
completely independent of us humans’ (p. 102). Tegmark shows that this hypothesis
implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, which is the view that ‘[o] ur external
physical reality is a mathematical structure’ (p. 102) and ‘[a] mathematical structure is
… abstract entities with relations between them’ (p. 104):
the conventional approach holds that a theory of mathematical physics can be
broken down into (i) a mathematical structure, (ii) an empirical domain and (iii) a
set of correspondence rules which link parts of the mathematical structure with
parts of the empirical domain. If the [Mathematical Universe Hypothesis] is
correct, then (ii) and (iii) are redundant in the sense that they can, at least in
principle, be derived from (i). (Tegmark 2008, p.140).
The eventuality that our world is mathematical is also noted by Dorr (2010):
Perhaps we cannot even rule out a priori the even more radical hypothesis that
some or all of the objects of our acquaintance are themselves mathematical
objects, as in the ‘hyper-Pythagorean’ views entertained by Quine (1976) and
Tegmark (2008). (p. 141).
Therefore, Kim’s generalized principle does not permit us to know where (in what
type of universe) we are. Additionally, if the principle is true, then there may be other
types of existences, but we can never come into contact with them. The lesson is that
the principle is not that informative. In the next section, we specify a causal closure
definition and attempt to alter it to improve on the situation.
3 Causal Closure 1.1
For Steinhart (2009), ‘[a] universe is causally closed iff all causes of events in the
universe are in the universe, and all effects of events in the universe are in the universe’
(p. 43). This definition permits events to be cause-less. To improve on Steinhart’s
definition, we can consider causal closure from the perspective of a potential multitude
of universes. The principle of causal closure, evidently, is about one universe, not about
there being only one universe. From this perspective, it seems sufficient to focus on the
first condition of Steinhart’s definition. If we alter ‘the universe’ to ‘a/the same
universe’, then we obtain ‘all causes of events in a universe are in the same universe’.
Now, it seems superfluous to add the second, modified condition that ‘all effects of
events in a universe are in the same universe’ since the causes of events do not leave the
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particular universe. If ‘an effect of an event in a universe were in another universe’,
then that would contradict the principle that ‘all causes of events in a universe are in the
same universe’ since the event in this case is clearly a cause.
Therefore, on the multiverse view, we can define causal closure as ‘all causes of
events in a universe are in the same universe’. To improve on this definition, we will
actually make it less strong. First, we conclude that if there is only one universe, then
we do not need to concern ourselves with closure principles. Next, we focus on
whether, if there is more than one universe, we can state the weaker principle that no
cause of another universe causes an event in our universe. On this view, if there is only
one universe, then we are secure as to where the causes come from; additionally, if
there is more than one universe, then we are safe from having causes that come in from
any of the other universes.
4 A Loophole
Another odd feature of both Kim’s principle and Steinhart’s definition is that on those
bases, a very first thing or event in a universe cannot be caused. If all causes of events
are in the universe, then the cause of the first event is also in the universe but that is
impossible, given that this event did not cause itself (if we take it that causes are prior to
their effects). If we adopt the updated definition of causal closure, however, then we
have potential access to a ‘causal closure loophole’. With the weaker claim that no
cause of another universe causes anything in our universe, we gain the possibility of an
interface between universes.
If all causes of events in a universe belong to either the universe itself or an interface
between the universe itself and another universe, then the principle that no cause of
another universe causes an event in our universe is not violated. For instance, if we
view the frequently conjectured event of the Big Bang as an interface between
universes, then with the altered definition, we are allowed to view the universe as
causally closed, even though the cause of the Big Bang is external to the universe
because the Big Bang is not part of our universe. Thus, on this view, causal closure
permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. On this basis,
universes are not affected by other universes directly but rather indirectly.
To obtain a clear view of this picture, we recapitulate our discussion. Steinhart’s
(2009) standard definition of causal closure tells us that ‘[a] universe is causally closed
iff all causes of events in the universe are in the universe, and all effects of events in the
universe are in the universe’ (p. 43). On the one hand, this definition leaves a very first
event in a universe cause-less unless it causes itself (or has its cause preceding it). On
the other hand, this definition permits cause-less events, which seems to have the effect
that we can and must abandon any inquiries into a first event of a (our) universe.
However, if we alter this definition, focusing on where the causes are not instead of
where they are and state that a universe is causally closed if and only if no cause of
another universe causes an event in our universe, then we are free to look closer to the
possibility that a first event in a universe has a cause.
Naturally, this cause of a first event of a universe cannot belong to another universe.
However, on the ‘loophole’ view of causal closure, there is another possibility. We can
add a disjunct to the phrase ‘all causes of events in a universe belong to the very
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universe’ and state that ‘all causes of events in a universe belong to the universe itself or
to an interface between the universe itself and another universe’ without violating the
updated version of causal closure.
5 Interfaces between Universes
An interface between universes, first, cannot be a universe. This assertion calls for
investigations into what a universe is and what a universe is not, work that must be
postponed. Second, we nevertheless have some facts to consider. On the ‘loophole’
view, universes have ‘events’, ‘causes’ and ‘effects’. For instance, D1 and D2 above
have these occurrences. When we examine an interface, however, it appears as though
we have the same ingredients (why the ‘loophole’ view perhaps could end up being
incoherent1): If the cause of an (first) event in our universe comes from an interface,
then that interface contains a cause. Additionally, if we were to utilize the updated
definition, it should be possible to consider a cause of an event in the interface,
supposedly implying the existence of an ‘effect’ in the interface. If the cause, the effect
or both constitute an event, then we have the triad of ‘event’, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ in the
interface.
That we have the same elements in a ‘universe’ and in an ‘interface’ does not
necessarily imply that the ‘loophole’ is closed. A resolution can be conceived in terms
of, e.g., quantity. A mathematical point, e.g., consists of the kind ‘points’ just as the
mathematical line does. Nevertheless, the mathematical line is not a point and vice
versa.2
Another alternative for the possibility of interfaces of the kind discussed is that
universes have dimensional properties that are not shared with interfaces. An obvious
possible scenario is that an interface is not causally closed. If we say that a universe is
causally closed and that an interface is not, then we immediately observe that an
interface is not a universe. Additionally, if something in the interface has its cause
outside it, it is true that the interface is not a universe. Additionally, we can let the
updated definition of causal closure come to work and observe how it makes sense that
the cause of something in the interface comes from somewhere else. With the updated
version of causal closure, it is not necessary that the effects of causes in a universe take
place in that universe: Provided that we move with universes, the effects of causes in a
universe stay in that very universe since any other universe has no effects with causes
coming from it. If we move with a mixture of universes and an interface, however, then
it is fully appropriate to consider that an event in a universe causes an effect in an
interface. An effect in a universe with its cause coming from an interface is also
permitted on the loophole view, as noted above in regard to the Big Bang.
1 It would be incoherent if it stated that 1. there is at least one interface between universes and 2. the stating of
an interface between universes is inconsistent. On the contrary, the ‘loophole’ view (implicitly) states only that
causal closure is consistent with the possibility of an interface. If an interface, per se, is impossible, then we
should drop the second disjunct in the updated definition of causal closure (‘all causes of events in a universe
belong to the universe itself or to an interface between the universe itself and another universe’).
2 For an analogy in this vein, regard an incidence axiom of Hilbert: ‘There exist at least three points that do not
lie on the same line’. Concerning a universe, we could postulate that it contains at least x (x > 1), e.g., ‘causes’,
whereas an interface could be postulated to contain, say, one ‘cause’.
Philosophia
Thus, it is not necessary that interfaces be universes. However, whether there are any
interfaces at all, is another story.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Dorr, C. (2010). Of Numbers and Electrons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2 pt2):133–181.
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT
Press.
Quine, W. van. Orman 1976: ‘Whither Physical Objects?’. In R. S. Cohen, Paul K. Feyerabend, and Marx W.
Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, pp. 497–504. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Steinhart, E. (2009). More Precisely: The Math You Need to do Philosophy. Broadview Press.
Tegmark, M. (2008). The mathematical universe. Foundations of Physics, 38, 101–150.
Philosophia
